

Reading Xu Bing’s “Book from the Sky:” A Case Study in the Making of Meaning

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I am not concerned here to speculate on authorial intent—what Xu Bing’s “Book from the Sky (tianshu)” might mean to him as the artist. And there are better informed scholars available to evaluate the many different, often insightful sociological and political interpretations of this installation. I am not an art historian who might be able to make profitable associations between tianshu and other examples of “conceptual art”—a genre of art that promises a message we might not immediately understand, but that invites an open-ended range of speculation about meaning. I do however want to dispute any suggestion that Xu Bing can be explained as playing largely to a foreign audience without significant recourse to his own Chinese cultural tradition. Are such Chinese artists ideologically imprisoned as they depend on Western values and discourse for their art? To put it simply, is this contemporary art rooted in Chinese culture, or is it yet another excellent example of what some would interpret as cultural self-colonization?

All that I have to offer here is what the “new art” of tianshu means to me as a student of Chinese philosophy when I attempt to locate it within the formative cosmological assumptions of Chinese culture—a phenomenological description of my own response to Xu Bing’s art if you will. I want to argue that for me at least, Xu Bing’s tianshu certainly evokes some associations that are decidedly Western—James Joyce’s enigmatic Finnegans Wake, for example, comes immediately to mind.

But Xu Bing’s work also stimulates a much richer reflection that is located squarely within a familiar Chinese cultural discourse and a demonstrably Chinese understanding of the way in which language works in the production of meaning. I want to suggest that in contrast with this Chinese understanding, there are persistent cosmological assumptions about language and meaning that have predominated within our own philosophical narrative that would at least retard a similar response if not provoke a fundamentally different interpretation of tianshu.

Indeed, there is a profoundly serious philosophical question prompted by Xu Bing’s tianshu—Where does meaning come from? An attempt to answer this question will provide us with the occasion to distinguish Chinese cosmology from our own persistent ontological assumptions about language and creativity. But before embarking on this philosophical excursus that tianshu invites, I want to first reflect on a more fanciful response that the culturally-informed observer might have at a less deliberate and more immediate level. However opaque the tianshu text might appear, there are familiar formal continuities with contemporary Chinese written culture that give it a logic and coherence—the individual, self-contained graphs themselves as a distinctive style of writing, a finite, yet sufficient vocabulary of some 4000 characters (about the same number as recognized by an educated Chinese person), the proportional redundancy of the characters, the physical structure and organization of a stitched book with title page, table of contents, front matter, columns, and folio and verso pagination, the inclusion of interlinear commentary in smaller characters, the familiar carved calligraphic brush strokes of 12th century woodblock printing, and so on. And even more suggestive of legibility, in the construction of the tianshu “characters,” many of the 214 standard “radicals” or “signifiers” are used that tell us that the meaning of this particular character has some reference to “earth” or “silk thread,” to “cutting” or “handling.” The promise of textual prophecy—of the text speaking its message—lies in the degree to which it evokes a familiar sense of language, and arouses an anticipation of meaning in the observer. At this level, the promise and the disappointment must be more meaningful to someone who is literate in the Chinese language than someone who is not.
The not unfamiliar title of the new art, *tianshu*, reiterates this promise that the text is meaningful. The art historian, Wu Hung has argued that colloquially, *tianshu* in this context would mean “nonsense writing”—“abstruse or illegible writing that makes no sense to its reader.” A necessary clarification of Wu Hung’s claim would be that *tianshu* is not to be understood as nonsense in the sense of mere unintelligible scribble. Indeed, within this inherited Chinese cultural legacy, an encounter with an inaccessible, esoteric “text” of one kind or another—a “nonsense writing” that resists our reading and understanding—is not an altogether unfamiliar experience.

We might be prompted to think of *tianshu* as “historical” by the fact that there is enough continuity with our current sense of the written language that we can identify it as such. At the same time it evokes an antique primordiality in that its unintelligibility suggests that the novelty attending an always continuing present has outrun its linguistic reference. What once was a determinate, rational language has become residual, and we are left with an obsolete vocabulary that would speak if it could of a lost world before the birthing of our present linguistic epoch—of a profoundly literate civilization that we no longer have the cultural competence to know.

If we were to think speculatively and more historically, one possible association one might have with the *tianshu* is these characters are some long lost language of the mysterious Xia dynasty or some earlier proto-Chinese culture that, having vanished from sight in the morning mists of history, are still at least formally continuous with an always emergent Chinese literate culture. After all, subsequent to the Xia is the Shang dynasty from which we have only in the last century inherited the language of the oracle bones—the *jiaguwen*—written on the physical medium of bovid scapula and turtle plastron that are less familiar than the *tianshu* books. These oracle bones contain a rich although largely incomprehensible vocabulary of some 3000 characters that are unintelligible to most people. Indeed only trained paleographers are able to read them, while even this expert group with a century of painstaking detective work behind them has only been able to decipher about 1000 of the 3000 characters.

When we are confronted by this “nonsense” *tianshu* text, a playful and fanciful response is thus to seek for the security of a specific, culturally revealing context—to make the text familiar and friendly by locating it historically as some archaic or esoteric form of transmission. Of course, this attempt to seek context is going to be one source of difference that indeed “adds up to something” when entertained from within a Chinese cultural sensibility.

But when we “read” Xu Bing’s *tianshu* as an invitation to search for meaning, it shuts down our usual expectations and redirects the inquiry to another level. The unyielding recalcitrance of the “language” takes us beyond any of these rather desperate contextualizing speculations, and forces upon us the profoundly philosophical question: Where does meaning come from—how is meaning made? And how does language convey this meaning? How do we construct our imaginaire?

Chinese process cosmology is the continuing “emergence” of order—a hermeneutical assumption about how meaning is made that will not allow for any severe distinction between “text” and the productiveness of interpretation. “Emergence” is a *creatio in situ* assumption about creative advance, and is captured early in the Chinese tradition in the expression *tiyong*—“the mutuality of reforming and functioning.” The earliest extant occurrence of this *tiyong* expression is by the commentator (and philosopher) Wang Bi (226-249) in his interpretation of Chapter 38 of the *Daodejing*, but it becomes ubiquitous in subsequent Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist philosophical reflection. Simply put, in Chinese cosmology, all creativity is construed as a situated and radically embedded, collaborative co-creativity. Creating oneself and creating one’s world is a coterminal and mutually entailing process.

Perhaps the clearest canonical statement of this notion of emergent co-creativity is Zongyong 25 in its explanation of *cheng*—a familiar term usually translated as “sincerity” or “integrity,” but herein used with a less familiar cosmological application about the production of meaning. Immediately relevant to our reflection on the “language” of *tianshu*, the etymology of the character *cheng* itself suggests “consummating or completing (cheng)” through “discourse (yan).” This cosmological application of *cheng* has prompted us along with other commentators to consider “creativity” as an appropriate alternative to “sincerity.”
or “integrity” in rendering it in this important passage:

Creativity (cheng) is self-consuming (zhicheng), and its way (dao) is self-advancing (zidao). “Creativity” references anything (wu) taken from its beginning to its end, and without this creativity, there are no things or events. It is thus that, for exemplary persons (junzi), it is creativity that is prized. But creativity is not simply the self-consuming of one’s own person; it is whatconsummates other things. Consummating oneself is becoming authoritative in one’s conduct (ren); consummating other things is exercising wisdom in realizing one’s world (zh).\(^5\) It is text quite literally breaks into song in celebration of the human capacity to create meaning and to realize its world, describing the consummatory human being as fully a co-creator with the heavens and the earth in the emergent order of the cosmos. In the Chinese cosmology expressed here, the lived world is the bottomless unfolding of an emergent, contingent world according to the rhythm of its own internal creative processes without any fixed pattern or guiding hand. Indeed, the absence of any creator “God” in this cosmology lifts the bar rather significantly on the degree of creativity expected from the human collaborator.

Having said this, the “emergent” sense of creativity is not entirely unfamiliar in our recent philosophical narrative. But as the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo observes, the Anglo-European world has come relatively late to its current hermeneutical awareness of how the commentary as well as the text is a significant source of meaning:

By the productiveness of interpretation, I mean that interpretation is not only an attempt to grasp the original meaning of the text (for example the authorial intention) and to reproduce it as literally as possible but also to add something essential to the text (to understand it better than its author, the adage resonating in eighteenth century hermeneutics). . . . \(^7\) The European culture of late modernity “discovered” the productiveness of interpretation or— which is the same—the nonepiphenomenality, instrumentality, or secondariness of the commentary.\(^8\)

Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” is only a fairly recent philosophical cliché. In fact, I want to argue that the Chinese cosmology in which the factic life-experience is processual, “never stopping night or day”\(^7\) places it historically in rather stark contrast to the “logocentrism” of the pre-Darwinian Anglo-European philosophical narrative that has inspired the internal critique to which Vattimo alludes. To use Heidegger’s language, our narrative begins from “theo-ontological” rather than cosmological questions—the search for some permanent and certain reality, a logos, that grounds and causally explains appearances with only a secondary interest in a prescription for how changing things can hang together most productively. In this search for a unifying “reality,” one specific aspect of the human religious, philosophical, physical, and volitional experience—God, rationality, matter, or will—has often been lifted out of the always fluid process and then privileged as causal and originative.

Until the philosophic revolution beginning slowly with Darwin and gaining real cultural ascendancy only over the past generation or so, we have been importantly a “logocentric” tradition. Logocentrism with respect to language is the assumption that a literal language of presence can be recovered in an “archaeology” of a text—the search for primitive origins or beginnings. On the analogy of the Logos as expressed in the scriptures, a search is undertaken for the objective authorial intent as a source of meaning that stands quite independent of the reader or the text’s changing context, where interpretation is merely derivative and instrumental. The Platonic and Aristotelian quest for essential definitions—what-it-is-to-be-things-of-this-kind—as the true objects of knowledge, and the primary understanding of etymology as the search for the original—indeed, the “true (etymos)”—meaning of a word is closely linked to the traditional importance of
creatio ex nihilo in our assumptions about the ultimate source of meaning. The putative search for the “literal” meaning behind the metaphorical or interpretive is itself a search for origins, for the reality behind appearances, a quest for certainty. Indeed, “in the beginning was the Word, the logos.”

Let me try to bring the contrast between this familiar creatio ex nihilo sense of creativity and the Chinese commitment to creatio in situs into clearer focus. In the course of time, the high expectations of the human experience that we find in the Zhongyong have produced an a-theistic religiousness that elevates the cultivated human experience into cosmic proportions. Human beings, without reference to limiting assumptions about religious transcendentalism and supernaturalism, have become a source of profound meaning in their own world—the only world. Cosmic creativity is fully a collaboration between human beings and their own environing context. Indeed, it is the cosmic import of human co-creativity that moves the Zhongyong to its religious crescendo:

Only those in the world of utmost creativity (zhicheng) are able to separate out and braid together the many threads on the great loom of the world. Only they set the great root of the world and realize the transforming and nourishing processes of heaven and earth.

How could there be anything on which they depend? So earnest, they are authoritative (ren); So profound, they are a bottomless abyss (yuan); So pervasive, they are tian (tian).

Only those whose own capacities of discernment and sagely wisdom extend to the powers of tian could possibly understand them.10

Borrowing an expression from the Yijing, Tang Junyi has described this processual flow of experience without initial beginning or end as “the notion of ceaseless procreation.”11 Experience is persistent, historicist, and naturalistic in the sense of having no appeal to any metaphysical or supernatural source. Meaning is emergent in the transactions among the unique things that constitute the world.

The phenomenological world in classical China is an endless flow, evidencing its formal character only as “trans-formation.” In fact, the Great Commentary says explicitly that “spirituality is without squareness and change is without body.”12 “Things” are in fact a processive and hence always provisional flux of “events,” where the shifting dispositioning of these events is interactive and mutually shaping.13

When we locate tianshu within these underlying cosmological assumptions, we have to realize that in this early and persistent Chinese cosmology, language and people are the outside and inside of the same thing where meaning is made through productive associations. Hans-Georg Gadamer observes:

The “use” of words is not a “using” at all. Rather language is a medium, an element: language is the element in which we live, as fishes live in water. . . . In the exchange of words, the thing meant becomes more and more present. A language is truly a “natural language” when it binds us together in this way.14

The Chinese processual cosmology would perhaps take this understanding of language one step further and claim that, more than a medium, language is constitutive of who we are as irreducibly relational people. Indeed the medium and the message are one and the same. If we pursue the question: “what does relationality mean?” we must allow that these various modalities of discourse are certainly key—a relationship is “relating to” or “giving an account of oneself.” We create each other through linguistic intercourse.

It is within these cosmological assumptions about language and human co-creativity expressed in texts such as the Zhongyong that we have to locate Xu Bing’s tianshu. At an intellectual level, tianshu certainly presents us with the question that we have rehearsed above: Where does meaning come from? And in so doing, tianshu has enabled us to make an important distinction between the creatio ex nihilo sensibility of some single, independent, originate, and determinative authority that has had such broad play within the Western philosophical narrative, and the creatio in situs (tianshu) sense of emergent, participatory meaning so familiar and persistent within Chinese cosmology.

When considered from the creatio in situs perspective, tianshu initially in resisting understanding interrupts the ecology of meaning-making and self-articulation. While frustrating our search for immediate linguistic meaning, tianshu presents us with the incipient, the inchoate, the yet indeterminate—a still dark yet promising hint of meaning that forces a confrontation with our own unique imaginative powers of commentary and interpretation.

The Daodejing 56 tells us:

Those who really understand it do not talk about it, And those who talk about it do not really understand it.

What does this say say? The Zhuangzi can serve as commentary here. In the Zhuangzi’s description of what it calls “tipping goblet” words (zhiyan), we find the contrast between the putatively “full” language of reference and authority and the “empty” language that always requires refilling. Language is constituted primarily by premise-dependent disputational words (yuyan) and the weighty, conversation-stopping words of orthodoxy and authority (chongyang). Zhiyan are words whose function invokes the image of a goblet that empties out automatically when filled to the brim, and then again rights itself to offer the opportunity be filled once again. According to the Zhuangzi:

Words that have premises occupy some 90% of our speech, and weighty, repeatable sayings occupy 70% of that. “Tipping goblet” words are new every time, and achieve a productive coherence on the revolving wheel of nature.

The 90% of words that have premises appeal to something beyond themselves for justification. It is like the father who will not act as the
matchmaker for his own son because the praises of someone other than the father are more persuasive than his own. The onus thus falls on someone other than oneself. People accept only what accords with their own premises, and reject what does not—they give affirmation to what accords with their premises and take exception when it is otherwise.

Canonical sayings that occupy 70% of such speech are conversation-stoppers, so they must come from our seniors. But where such persons are merely ahead of us in years but do not have the comprehensive know-how and discrimination we expect from elders, they are not ahead at all. Indeed, a person who does not have access to our precursors has no cultural legacy, and without it, is simply called old and useless.

The “tipping goblet” words that are new every time and achieve a productive coherence on the revolving wheel of nature can be relied upon to meet the ceaseless changes in life and to realize one’s full complement of years. There is parity in not speaking. . . . Thus there is the saying: “Do not say anything.” If in speaking you do not say anything, then in a lifetime of speaking you have yet to say anything, and in a lifetime of not saying anything you have never failed to speak up.

From one perspective something is permissible, and yet from another it is not; from one perspective something is so, and yet from another it is not so. What makes something so? Declaring it so makes it so. What makes it not so? Declaring it not so makes it not so. What makes it permissible? Declaring it permissible makes something permissible. What makes it not permissible? Declaring it not permissible makes it not permissible. Everything as a matter of course has that which is so about it, and that which is permissible about it. There is nothing that is not so and that is not permissible. If it were not for “tipping goblet” words that are new every time and that achieve a productive coherence on the revolving wheel of nature, who could endure for long?10

Zhiyan is language understood as responsive to context and thus always appropriate: a living, emergent vocabulary that is constantly being reinvested and reauthorized as the cultural conversation continues. The Zhuangzi is declaring the speciousness of any “literal” metanarrative that would promise to give us access to some foundational truth—what is identified here specifically as referential language that has premises (yuyan) and that is freighted with the authority of repeatable, canonical sayings (zhongyan). Indeed, this chapter of the Zhuangzi is often construed as a commentary on statements made about language in the “Inner Chapters:”

Saying is not just exhaling breath; it is supposed to be saying something. The problem is that, since what is said is not fixed, in the final analysis are we saying something or have we in fact said nothing at all? People surmise that language is different from the twittering of fledgling birds, but in fact is there really any way of making this distinction?16

Language as the ceaseless flow of reality is what the Zhuangzi means when it insists on having a further word with the person who has forgotten words:

The reason for fishtraps is to catch fish, but having caught the fish, you forget the fishtrap. The reason for rabbit snares is to snare rabbits, but having caught the rabbit, you forget the snare. The reason for words is to capture meaning, but having grasped the meaning, you forget the words. Where can I find a person who has forgotten the words so that I can have a word with him.17

Without fixed reference, all we have is language as a currency for productively renegotiating situations as they arise—what Richard Rorty calls our possibility to generate infinite “redescriptions” (or perhaps better, “represcriptions”) so that the conversation might continue. Silence is not an option—it is an inverse obstinacy to literal language. What we need is to speak up and say nothing—that is, to say no “thing” as an object of fixed reference. That in a lifetime of such speaking, one can claim to have said nothing, is consistent with Daodejing 78 that states “appropriate language seems contradictory.” Indeed, the Zhuangzi’s zhiyan all language becomes art—it becomes poetry in which the text emerges in its full autonomy. In Gadamer’s words, “here language just stands for itself, it brings itself to stand before us.”18 What Gadamer means, I think, is that poetry is presentation, and cannot be treated instrumentally and reductively as representation.

An example of the “nonsense” tianshu text.

For the Zhuangzi it is the flexibility of this kind of language that enables us to survive. Xu Bing’s “characters” are such “tipping goblet” words that in standing invitingly empty before us, declare the impermanence and ultimate emptiness of any invested authority while at the same assuring us of the inexhaustible flow of adaptable, always provisional meaning.

If we allow that the process of meaning-making is made possible by the productive indeterminacy of image and language, with only the dawn or twilight of meaning available in viewing tianshu, we are overwhelmed by the weight of that indeterminacy. We might not be able to read the graphs themselves, but in our struggle to do so we do presuppose access to the unmarked conjunctions and
transitions that animate the Chinese language, and these fluid transitions and conjunctions give us the “and” of additional significance.

Language thus conceived as context and relation-dependent and at the same time, open and indeterminate, has the potential to liberate and animate our own aesthetic responsibility as co-creators—to release our unmediated, authentic experience of temporality, our gongfu. The encounter with tianshu presents us with an opportunity for recovering the personal aesthetic experience by bringing into question “literalism” and the culture of the Book. The “meaningless” text forces us, in the absence of the normal contextualizing relations of “community,” “reference,” “dogma,” and “science” that is usually freighted in a shared language, to acknowledge in a continuing present our own vital lived historicity, our factic life. It forces what Vattimo calls a “weakening of thinking”—a thinking without the oppressive, aggregating historical narrative presumed in the everyday use of language.

On the one hand, this abrupt awareness can be frustrating if not frightening. We are, in real degree, confronted with a feeling of cultural dyslexia if not amnesia. To the extent that the text is identifiable as “language” and yet stands empty, it is a disintegrating encounter with linguistic “ruins” that threatens our faith and feeling of security in the persistence of a shared commonsense. It is an experience that undermines our sense of communal solidarity and our assumed competence, underscoring the ultimate precariousness of the human experience.

On the other hand, this stimulating encounter has the potential to renew our confidence in our own creative and penetrating subjectivity. In the receding objectivity and orthodoxy, we are renewed as unique, historical, contingent, and provisional beings who struggle with imagination to quite literally make sense of the nonsense. Reassuring objective definition and true description gives way to the authentic experience of temporality—existential language as the source of our song and our poetry. Indeed, it is this “authentic temporality,” our historicity, that is the mystery and inspiration of art. As a response to the life-threatening, suffocating weight of objectivity, life itself is nothing more or less than making a difference.

But at the same time, we must not overstate the indeterminacy. We must remember that this confrontation with our “lived historicity” is not pure, raw, and vacant, as Sartre would have us believe. It is a specious present still located within a most particular historical continuity that will not be denied. Indeed, it is this historical continuity that, in the absence of conventional meaning, is at once our most primordial identity and our remaining resource for real spontaneity—a liberated virtuosity that certainly exhorts us to think outside the box, but inevitably, from inside this box.

What is at stake in the liberation of our historicity is the renewed possibility of the aesthetic and religious quality of experience itself. The weakening of erstwhile commanding values and definitive doctrines that perpetuate an hierarchical center allows for the renewal of our creative possibilities through a proliferation of our own existential narratives. The world becomes ever more beautiful and spiritual through the ongoing embellishment of the tradition as we add the meanings of our own significant, inspired lives.

Endnotes
1 I do, however, think it would be naïve to think that we can separate in any final way the artist and the connoisseur, where in the aesthetic project that artist is anticipating appreciation, and the connoisseur is searching for the creative act. See John Dewey, “Having an Experience” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, edited by John J. McDermott (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973).
2 I am thinking here of the work of Homi Bhabha in his Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994).
4 See Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001):30-5 for our justification for translating cheng as “creativity” along with the commentarial evidence that supports such a rendering.
5 This passage is reminiscent of Analects 6.23:
   The Master said, “The wise (zhì) enjoy water; those authoritative in their conduct (ren) enjoy mountains. The wise are active; authoritative persons are still. The wise find enjoyment; authoritative persons are long-enduring.”
6 Wisdom entails appropriateness to context (see Analects 6.22). Thus, in realizing oneself, one necessarily brings realization to one’s situation.
7 Zhongyong 5.
9 Analects 9.17.
12 Great Commentary A4.
13 In fact, at least as early as the Ming dynasty, the Chinese expression for “thing,” dongxi, is literally “east-west,” underscoring the relational and contextual understanding that attends Chinese phenomenological perceptions.
14 David Ramsay Steele, Genius in Their Own Words (Chicago: Open Court, 2002):196.
17 Zhuangzi 75/26/48-9.